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Positional goodsRecent evidence suggests that social comparisons between people in different countries have become more
important over time due to globalization. This paper deals with optimal nonlinear income taxation in an interna-
tional setting, where consumers derive utility from their relative consumption compared bothwith other domes-
tic residents and people in another country. The optimal tax policy in our framework reﬂects both correction for
positional externalities and redistributive aspects of such correction due to the incentive constraint facing each
government. If the national governments behave as Nash competitors to each other, the resulting tax policy
only internalizes the externalities that are due to within-country comparisons, whereas the tax policy chosen
by the leader country in a Stackelberg game also to some extent reﬂects between-country comparisons.
We also derive globally Pareto-efﬁcient tax policies in a cooperative framework, and conclude that there are
potentially large welfare gains of international tax policy coordination.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The issue of international tax coordination has recently gainedmuch
attention, largely due to the work by Piketty (2014). His central policy
recommendation in order to deal with growing inequalities is interna-
tional tax policy coordination, in particular with respect to capital
taxes and progressive income taxes, where the need for tax coordina-
tion is motivated primarily by international capital mobility. In the
present paper we analyze another potentially powerful motive for in-
ternational tax coordination, namely international social comparisons.
Our motivation and approach are outlined below.ive referees, participants at the
othenburg and at theworkshop
Toulouse, and seminar partici-
en and at the Universities of
tions. Research grants from the
Council for Working Life and
through project number RS10-
Aronsson),
.
. This is an open access article underThe globalization process has implied that information about people
and their living conditions in other parts of the world has increased
rapidly in recent decades. Indeed, the technological advancement of
TV, Internet, and social media together with increased traveling have
resulted in much better knowledge of the living conditions of others,
and of some people in particular (such as the rich and famous), than
was the case only a couple of decades ago. This suggests that people's
reference consumption is increasingly determined by consumption
levels in other countries than their own. The present paper examines
such between-country comparisons and identiﬁes the corresponding
implications for optimal income tax policy, which to our knowledge
have not been addressed before.
A rapidly growing literature deals with optimal tax policy implica-
tions of relative consumption concerns based on one-country models;
see, e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Oswald (1983), Frank (1985a,
2005, 2008), Tuomala (1990), Persson (1995), Corneo and Jeanne
(1997), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Ireland (2001), Dupor and Liu
(2003), Abel (2005), Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2010),
Wendner (2010, 2014), Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2011, 2012),
Eckerstorfer and Wendner (2013), and Kanbur and Tuomala (2014).
Our paper extends this literature to a two-country framework, where
each individual derives utility from his/her relative consumptionthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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country. More speciﬁcally, the main purpose is to examine the implica-
tions for optimal income taxation of such a broader framework for social
comparisons. In doing so, we analyze the tax policy outcome of Nash
and Stackelberg competition between national governments as well as
characterize the Pareto efﬁcient marginal income tax structure for the
global economy as a whole.
Much of the empirical happiness and questionnaire-based research
dealing with individual well-being and relative consumption is silent
about the role of cross-country comparisons, which is not surprising
given the difﬁculties of measuring such effects.1 Yet, several authors
have recently suggested that such comparisons have most likely
become more important over time (e.g., Friedman, 2005; Zhang et al.,
2009; Clark and Senik, 2011; Becchetti et al., 2013).2 For example,
Becchetti et al. (2013) examine the determinants of self-reported life
satisfaction using survey-data for countries in Western Europe from
the early 1970s to 2002. To be able to assess the effects of cross-
country comparisons and whether these effects have changed over
time, the authors control for determinants of subjective well-being
discussed in earlier literature, including relative income measures
based on national comparisons (across education, age, and gender
groups) as well as domestic GDP. Interestingly, the results show that
the distance between the GDP of the individual's own country and the
GDP of the richest country in the data reduces individual life satisfac-
tion, and that the contribution of such cross-country comparisons to
well-being increased over the study period. A possible interpretation
is that the increased globalization through technological advancements
in recent decades has meant that social comparisons between countries
now have a greater inﬂuence on individual well-being than before.3
Moreover, Piketty (2014) argues that cross-country social compari-
sons seem to constitute an important part of the motivation behind
Thatcher's and Reagan's drastic income tax reductions in the early
1980s. At that time, both the US and the UK had seen lower growth
rates than other Western European countries and Japan for several
decades and hence experienced that other countries were catching up.
According to Piketty (2014, 509): “For countries as well as individuals,
the wealth hierarchy is not just about money; it is also a matter of
honor and moral values.”
The policy implications of social comparisons between countries
remain largely unexplored. To our knowledge, the only exception is
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2014), who analyze the optimal
provision of national and global public goods in a two-country setting
where each individual derives well-being from his/her relative private
consumption through within- and between-country comparisons, as
well as from the relative consumption of national public goods through
between-country comparisons. However, their study does not address
optimal taxation but implicitly assumes that each government can
raise sufﬁcient revenue for public provision through lump-sum taxa-
tion, implying that both externality-correcting and redistributive roles
of the tax system are ignored.1 See, e.g., Easterlin (2001), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Blanchﬂower and Oswald
(2004), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Solnick and Hemenway (2005), Carlsson et al. (2007),
Clark et al. (2008), Senik (2009), Clark and Senik (2010), and Card et al. (2012). This liter-
ature typically assumes that relative consumption concerns are driven by within-country
comparisons (based on various reference groups) or does not specify relative consump-
tion in a jurisdictional context. Evidence for relative consumption concerns can also be
found in literature on brain science (Fliessbach et al., 2007; Dohmen et al., 2011) and in
experimental work on productivity (Cohn et al., 2014), and there are also plausible evolu-
tionary explanations for such concerns; see, e.g., Rayo and Becker (2007) and Wolpert
(2010).
2 See also James (1987) for an early discussion of how tastes (including positional con-
cerns) are transferred fromdeveloped to developing countries. Friehe andMechtel (2014)
analyze how the political regime affects preferences for conspicuous consumption based
on data for East and West Germany after the reuniﬁcation.
3 Arguably, this interpretation presupposes that relative consumption concerns are not
independent of access to social media. Indeed, in a recent survey of Europeans, Clark and
Senik (2010) found that people without access to the Internet are less concerned with
their relative consumption than people with such access.Thepresent study adds at least two important newdimensions. First,
since all previous studies on tax policy and relative consumption that
we are aware of are based on one-country model economies, the policy
incentives associated with between-country comparisons, as well as
those resulting from interaction between such comparisons and the
(conventional) within-country comparison, remain to be explored. Ar-
guably, this is empirically relevant for the reasons mentioned above.
Second, since between-country comparisons give rise to international
externalities, the tax policies decided by national governments are no
longer necessarily efﬁcient at the global level. This leads to the question
of tax policy coordination and cooperation among countries. There are
of course other well-known arguments for coordinated tax policy,
including cross-country environmental externalities as well as interna-
tional labor and capitalmobility; see, e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco (1993),
Huber (1999), Aronsson and Blomquist (2003), Keen and Konrad
(2013), and Bierbrauer et al. (2013). Yet, the issue of between-country
comparisons has been neglected so far in the study of tax policy under
social interaction. Since the aim is to better understand themechanisms
of social interaction and their tax policy implications, we will through-
out the paper ignore these other motives for policy coordination. This
does not reﬂect a belief that these other motives are less important,
but rather that they are well understood from earlier research.
Section 2 presents the basic model of a two-country economy,
where individual utility depends on the individual's own consumption
of goods and leisure as well as on the individual's relative consumption
based on within-country and between-country comparisons, respec-
tively. Section 3 deals with optimal income taxation for a baseline case
where individuals are identical within each country (although not
necessarily between the countries). Thismodel implies that income tax-
ation has no redistributive purpose and ismotivated solely by the desire
to internalize the positional externalities. As such, it generalizes results
derived by, e.g., Persson (1995), Ljungqvist andUhlig (2000), andDupor
and Liu (2003) to a two-country setting. We start with the non-
cooperative Nash solution, where each country takes the behavior of
the other country as given. Each government will then fully internalize
the positional externalities affecting people within its own country, but
completely ignore the externalities affecting the other country. These
externality-correcting taxes are expressed in terms of (empirically
estimable) degrees of positionality, i.e., the degree to which relative con-
sumption matters compared with absolute consumption.
However, while Nash competition is a common assumption in earli-
er literature on international externalities, it is not always the most
realistic one since the ability to commit to public policy may differ
among countries (e.g., due to differences in resources, size, and opportu-
nities). Therefore, we also analyze a Stackelberg equilibriumwhere one
country is acting leader and the other is a follower. While the policy
incentives faced by the follower are analogous to those in theNash equi-
librium, we show that the leader will also take into account the exter-
nalities it causes to the follower country. The reason is, of course, that
the leader recognizes the behavioral responses of the follower and
adapts its tax policy accordingly. If the preferences of the individuals
in the follower country are characterized by a keeping-up-with-the-
Joneses property, such that they prefer to consume more (and hence
use less leisure) when individuals in the leader country consume
more, ceteris paribus, then this constitutes a reason for the government
of the leader country to increase the marginal income tax rate beyond
the Nash equilibrium rate, and vice versa.
Section 4 analyzes the potential for cooperative behavior. First, we
show that there is scope for Pareto improvements through a small coor-
dinated increase in the marginal income tax rates, if the economy is in
Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium. Second, we consider a framework
where each government can pay the other country for increasing its
marginal income tax rates. We then obtain a globally Pareto-efﬁcient
allocation implying that each government will fully internalize all
positional externalities associated with private consumption, including
those imposed on the other country. This is in the symmetric case
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marginal willingness to pay of all individuals, within aswell as between
the countries, to avoid the externality. In turn, this corrective tax
depends on the extent to which relative consumption is important for
individual well-being both in the domestic and foreign dimensions.
Section 5 acknowledges the fact that some goods tend to be more
positional than others, and then outlines the implications in terms of
differential consumption taxation in a two-country world.
Section 6 generalizes the model used in Sections 3–4 to the more
realistic case where there are also redistributional concerns within
each country, and where the government has to rely on distortionary
taxation for this redistribution due to asymmetric information. This
generalization is clearly relevant from a practical policy perspective,
and also because earlier literature shows that the optimal tax policy re-
sponses to relative consumption concerns in second-best economies
may differ substantially from the policy responses typically derived in
a full information context (see, e.g., Oswald, 1983; Tuomala, 1990;
Ireland, 2001; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008, 2010).
As the basic work horse in Section 6, we use an extension of the two-
type model developed by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982), where the
government in each country can use nonlinear income taxes but cannot
tax leisure or ability directly. This two-type model provides a useful
framework for characterizinghow corrective and redistributionmotives
for taxation jointly contribute to policy incentives. From a practical pol-
icy perspective, this model obviously gives a highly simpliﬁed picture of
society.4 However, the purpose here is not to determine the appropriate
marginal tax levels but rather analyze how social comparisons modify
the policy rules for marginal income taxation. These modiﬁcations
would be very similar if they were instead based on a much less tracta-
blemodel withmany ability types.5 Based on such two-typemodels, we
then show that the basic ﬁndings obtained in Sections 3–4 continue to
hold under certain conditions, but that interactions between externality
correction and redistribution through the self-selection constraint may
also have important implications for optimal taxation.
Section 7 concludes that international social comparisons have
important implications for optimal income tax policy and that they
also constitute a potentially important reason for international tax
policy coordination — a reason that will most likely become even
more important over time as globalization continues. Proofs of theprop-
ositions are presented in the Appendix.6 Onemight object that the evolutionary arguments are stronger for social comparisons
within small groups than between countries, just as the evolutionary arguments for pro-
social behavior are stronger within small groups.While agreeing in principle, we still have
two counter-arguments: First, there is compelling evidence in favor of what Singer (1983)
denotes the expanding circlewith respect to pro-social behavior and ethics, i.e., that human
beings over time tend to take into account consequences for larger and larger groups of
people; see in particular Pinker (2012). Second, we are not biologically well adapted to re-
cent technological developments, implying, e.g., that wemay emotionally perceive people
on TV to be closer to us than most people who live on the same block.
7 In a working paper version, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2015), we show that
most results would carry over to an economy with n (instead of two) countries.
8 Although ﬂexible functional forms are preferable to more restrictive formulations,
ceteris paribus, it is of no great importance for the qualitative results whether the analysis
is based on difference comparisons (such as in Akerlof, 1997; Corneo and Jeanne, 1997;
Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; Bowles and Park, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007) or ratio compar-
isons (such as in Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Layard, 1980; Abel, 2005; Wendner and
Goulder, 2008). Mujcic and Frijters (2013) compare models based on difference compar-2. Preferences and individual behavior
In this section,we outline thebasics of ourmodel assuming that peo-
ple have preferences for relative consumption bothwithin and between
countries. We have no ambition to explain why people derive utility
from their relative consumption. An alternative approach would be to
start from conventional preferences where relative consumption has a
purely instrumental value (see, e.g., Cole et al., 1995, for arguments in
favor of this approach and Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2014, for an interest-
ing application in terms of matching). Yet, while we certainly share the
view that there are important instrumental reasons underlying why
relative consumption matters, we see two main reasons for simply im-
posing such concerns directly into the utility function in the present
paper. First, the fact that there has been an important evolutionary
value to have more wealth than others provides an obvious reason for4 For instance, results derived for the high-ability type in such a framework would only
be valid for the highest ability type in a model with more than two types. Indeed, the op-
timal tax policy implemented for the high-ability type in a two-type model tends to pro-
vide a bad approximation of the optimal tax policy for almost all ability levels in more
realistic models based on a continuous ability distribution. Yet, again, this does not affect
the insights provided in the present paper.
5 Another alternativewould be to consider a linear tax problem. However, results based
onmodels restricted to linear tax instruments are typicallymuch harder to interpret since
they, in addition to the inherent second-best problem due to information limitation, also
reﬂect the rather arbitrary linearity restriction.why selﬁsh genes would prefer to belong to people with preferences
for relative wealth and status (just as they would prefer to belong to
people with preferences for having sex and against eating poisoned
food); cf., Frank (1985b), Samuelson (2004), and Rayo and Becker
(2007).6 Second, the shortcut to ignore instrumental reasons in the
model, and hence focus solely on effects through the utility function,
makes themodel comparable tomuch earlier literature on public policy
and relative consumption as well as more tractable and suitable for
analyzing the optimal tax problems at stake.
The model consists of two countries with ﬁxed populations.7 To
begin with, we assume that the population in each country consists of
a ﬁxed number of identical individuals normalized to one. This assump-
tion is relaxed in Section 6 below, where we introduce differences in
ability (productivity) between individuals and assume that this ability
is private information. Each individual in country i derives utility from
his/her absolute consumption of goods, ci, and use of leisure, zi, and
also from his/her relative consumption compared with other people.
The latter is of two kinds: relative consumption compared with other
people in the individual's own country, Ri, and relative consumption
compared with people in the other country, Si. Relative consumption
of the ﬁrst kind can then be written as Ri ¼ riðci; ciÞ, where ci is average
consumption in country i. Correspondingly, we can write relative
consumption of the second kind, i.e., compared with people in the
other country k, as Si ¼ siðci; ckÞ. To simplify the analysis, we follow
many previous studies in assuming a convenient difference comparison
form,8 such that riðci; ciÞ ¼ ci−ci and siðci; ckÞ ¼ ci−ck.
The utility function faced by the representative individual in country
i is given by9
Ui ¼ vi ci; zi;Ri; Si
 
¼ vi ci; zi; ri ci; ci
 
; si ci; ck
  
¼ vi ci; zi; ci−ci; ci−ck
 
¼ ui ci; zi; ci; ck
  ; ð1Þ
where vi(⋅) and ui(⋅) are twice continuously differentiable. The function
vi(⋅) is assumed to be increasing in each argument and strictly quasi-
concave, and describes the individual's utility as a function of his/her
own consumption and use of leisure, respectively, as well as of his/her
relative consumption compared with others. The function ui(⋅) is a
convenient reduced form allowing us to shorten some of the notations
below. For further use, we summarize the relationships between
ui(⋅) and vi(⋅) as follows: uci = vci + vRi + vSi , uzi = vzi ,uici ¼−v
i
R, andu
i
ck
¼isons, ratio comparisons, and rank comparisons without being able to discriminate be-
tween them, whereas Corazzini et al. (2012) ﬁnd that absolute differences, and not only
rank, matter, suggesting that models based solely on rank comparisons are more restric-
tive than the other formulations. Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2013b) show that
the optimal tax policy implications of relative consumption concerns tend to be qualita-
tively similar regardless of whether these comparisons take the difference or ratio form.
9 Following most previous comparable literature, we assume that leisure is completely
non-positional, meaning that people only care about the absolute level of leisure.
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2013a) analyze a model of optimal taxation where
the consumers have positional preferences with respect to both private consumption
and leisure.
10 Thus, the corrective tax derived here resembles Nash equilibrium tax formulas in the
literature on environmental policy (e.g., van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 1992; Aronsson and
Löfgren, 2000).
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i = ∂ui/∂ci, vci =
∂vi/∂ci, vRi = ∂vi/∂Ri, and vSi = ∂vi/∂Si, and similarly for the other partial
derivatives. Note also that people in the different countries need not
be identical regarding consumption levels or preferences.
The government in country i can tax private income (andhence con-
sumption) by utilizing an income tax ti and distribute back the revenues
in lump-sum form, such that each individual receives a lump-sum
payment, τi, regardless of behavior. For simplicity we assume a linear
technology and perfect competition, implying zero proﬁts, and that
productivity is ﬁxed with before-tax wage rates wi. The individual
budget constraint can then be written as
wi Ω−zi
 
1−ti
 
þ τi ¼ ci; ð2Þ
where Ω is the total time available (i.e., 24 hours a day).
Although the measures of reference consumption facing the repre-
sentative consumer in country i, i.e., ci and ck , are endogenous in our
model, we assume that each individual treats them as exogenous. This
reﬂects the idea that each individual is small relative to the economy
as a whole, which is the conventional assumption in models with exter-
nalities. The individualﬁrst-order condition regarding the consumption-
leisure tradeoff then becomes
uicw
i 1−ti
 
¼ uiz; ð3Þ
where (as before) subscripts denote partial derivatives.
2.1. Degrees of positionality
The optimal tax policy presented below depends on the extent to
which relative consumption matters at the individual level (and not
just on whether or not it matters). Following Johansson-Stenman et al.
(2002) and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2014), we introduce
the concept of “degrees of positionality” as reﬂections of the extent to
which relative consumption matters for the marginal utility of con-
sumption. Sincewe have two countries,wewill have differentmeasures
for the extent to which relative consumption matters within the coun-
try and the extent to which it matters between countries.
Let us deﬁne the degree of domestic positionality as
αi ¼ v
i
Rr
i
c
vic þ viRric þ viSsic
¼ v
i
R
vic þ viR þ viS
; ð4Þ
where the last formulation follows due to our difference comparison
form. The variable αi thus reﬂects the fraction of the overall utility
increase from the last dollar consumed that is due to the increased rel-
ative consumption compared with other people in the individual's own
country. Similarly, we can deﬁne the degree of foreign positionality as
βi ¼ v
i
Ss
i
c
vic þ viRric þ viSsic
¼ v
i
S
vic þ viR þ viS
; ð5Þ
which reﬂects the fraction of the overall utility increase from the last
dollar consumed by the representative consumer in country i that is
due to the increased relative consumption compared with people in
the other country. The total degree of positionality is then corresponding-
ly deﬁned as
ρi ¼ αi þ βi; ð6Þ
meaning that ρi reﬂects the fraction of the utility increase from the last
dollar consumed that is due to increased relative consumption of any
kind, i.e., including comparisons with people both within and outside
the individual's own country.3. Optimal tax policy and noncooperative behavior
We start in Subsection 3.1 by considering the policy implications of a
Nash equilibrium such that each national government treats the deci-
sions made in the other country as exogenous. In Subsection 3.2, we
consider a Stackelberg equilibrium, where one of the countries is acting
as leader and the other as a follower.
3.1. Nash competition
The decision-problem of the government in country i implies the
maximization of Ui, where the externalities that each domestic resident
imposes on other domestic residents are taken into account, while the
externalities imposed on the other country remain uninternalized.
Thus, the government in country i recognizes that ci is endogenous,
while it treats ck as exogenous. By using that the tax revenue is returned
lump-sum to the consumer, the resource constraint for country i is
given by
wi Ω−zi
 
¼ ci: ð7Þ
For presentational convenience, we follow convention in the litera-
ture on optimal nonlinear taxation in writing the public decision-
problem in country i as a direct decision problem, which is solved by
choosing ci and zi to maximize the utility function in Eq. (1) subject to
the resource constraint and ci ¼ ci , while treating ck as exogenous.
Based on the utility formulation ui(⋅) in Eq. (1), the Lagrangean can be
written as
Li ¼ ui ci; zi; ci; ck
 
þ γi wi Ω−zi
 
−ci
 
: ð8Þ
The corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions are given by
uic þ uici ¼ γ
i; ð9Þ
uiz ¼ γiwi: ð10Þ
A Nash equilibrium in this economy is an allocation such that
Eqs. (3), (7), (9), and (10) are satisﬁed simultaneously for both coun-
tries. Since our model is based on the general utility functions given in
Eq. (1), rather than a speciﬁc functional form, we are of course not
able to derive closed form solutions for the variables involved. However,
such explicit solutions are not required for a general characterization of
themarginal income tax rates implicit in Nash equilibrium,which is our
concern here. By using Eqs. (9) and (10) and the private ﬁrst-order con-
dition for labor supply given by Eq. (3), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1. In Nash equilibrium, the marginal income tax rate facing
the representative consumer in country i is given by t i = α i.
Hence, themarginal tax is simply given by the sum of people's marginal
willingness to pay for an individual to reduce his/her consumption,
where the sum of the marginal willingness to pay is measured within
the individual's own country and equals the degree of domestic
positionality. This means that each government will fully internalize
the positional externalities within its own country, but will not at all in-
ternalize the positional externalities imposed on the other country.10
Therefore, it should be clear that the tax formula in Proposition 1 does
not implement a global welfare optimum, since transnational positional
externalities are ignored.
11 We can also observe that the government'smarginal willingness to pay increaseswith
the degree of domestic positionality. The intuition is that the larger αi is, the larger will be
the discrepancy between the government's and the consumers' assessment of themargin-
al utility of private consumption. Therefore, 1− αi serves to transform the consumers'
marginal willingness to pay into a measure of marginal willingness to pay for the
government.
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Assume now instead that country i is a Stackelberg leader in relation
to country k, a Stackelberg follower. While the government in country k
will then behave as in the Nash equilibrium, the optimization problem
for country i is modiﬁed. This is because iwill take into account welfare
effects on i caused by the changed actions in k that choices by i induce. As
a consequence, the government in country iwill not take the consump-
tion in country k as given (as in theNash equilibrium case) but rather let
it be a function of its own consumption, such that ck ¼ ckðciÞ. The follow-
ing characterization will be used for this relationship:
Deﬁnition 1. The consumption in country k is characterized by a cross-
country keeping-up-with-the-Joneses (staying-away-from-the-Joneses)
property with respect to the consumption in country i if
∂ck
∂ci
N 0 b0ð Þ:
To examine when this condition is fulﬁlled, let SMRSkcz ¼ ðukc þ ukck Þ=u
k
z
denote the social marginal rate of substitution between private con-
sumption and leisure from the point of view of country k, whose govern-
ment treats ci as exogenous. In other words, SMRSczk reﬂects the marginal
rate of substitution between private consumption and leisure in country
k for a given relative consumption within the country (but not between
the countries). We can then derive the following result:
Lemma 1.
∂ck
∂ci
N 0 b0ð Þ i f f ∂SMRS
k
cz
∂ci
N 0 b0ð Þ:
A Stackelberg equilibrium is in this model an allocation where the
leader-country satisﬁes the optimality conditions (3), (7), and (10) as
before, but where Eq. (9) is replaced with
uic þ uici þ u
i
ck
∂ck
∂ci
¼ γi: ð9aÞ
whereas the follower satisﬁes the same optimality conditions as in the
Nash equilibrium case. Using Deﬁnition 1 and Lemma 1, we are now
ready to analyze the optimal tax policy implicit in the Stackelberg
game equilibrium:
Proposition 2. The optimal marginal income tax formula in country k,
where the government is a Stackelberg follower, is the same as in the
Nash equilibrium. The optimal marginal income tax in country i, where
the government is a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis country k, is given by
ti ¼ αi þ ∂c
k
∂ci
βi:
Conditional on α i, therefore, the optimal marginal income tax rate facing
the Stackelberg leader is larger (smaller) than the optimal rate implied by
the Nash equilibrium formula if the utility function in country k is such that
∂SMRSkcz
∂ci
N 0 b0ð Þ;
meaning that the consumption in country k is characterized by a cross-
country keeping-up-with-the-Joneses (staying-away-from-the-Joneses)
property with respect to the consumption in country i.
Thus, the optimal marginal income tax rate in country i, the Stackelberg
leader, is larger than the rate corresponding to optimal taxation in the
Nash equilibrium if consumption becomesmore valuable relative to lei-
sure on the margin in country k due to a consumption increase incountry i, ceteris paribus. Intuitively, if increased consumption in coun-
try i induces people to consume more in country k, and hence causes
larger negative externalities on country i, this constitutes a reason to re-
duce the consumption in country i, and hence to increase the marginal
income tax.
4. Cooperative solutions
4.1. The scope for a Pareto-improving tax reform
We showed in Section 3 that each government in the Nash equilibri-
um will only internalize the positional externalities caused in its own
country. The same applies to the follower in the Stackelberg case,
while the leaderwill also add a component related to induced consump-
tion changes in the other country due to transnational keeping-up-
with-the-Joneses effects. Thus, there is scope for Pareto-improving tax
reforms:
Proposition 3. Based on either the Nash equilibrium or Stackelberg
equilibrium, there is scope for Pareto-improving tax reforms through
small increases in the marginal income tax rates.
Given that a Pareto improvement is possible, it is natural to ask how
much the government in country iwould bewilling to pay country k for
a small increase in tk, and how thismarginal willingness to pay depends
on the strength of the relative consumption concerns in country i. Sup-
pose that the countries are in Nash equilibrium and letMik denote gov-
ernment i's marginal willingness to pay for an increase in the marginal
income tax in country k, such that
Mik ¼
ui
ck
uic þ uici
∂ck
∂tk
:
By using Eqs. (1), (4), and (5) to derive ui
ck
=uic ¼−βi and uici=u
i
c ¼−αi,
we can rewrite this expression as
Mik ¼− β
i
1−αi
∂ck
∂tk
N 0; ð11Þ
where the inequality holds provided that the consumption in country k
decreases (and leisure increases) when the marginal income tax in
country k increases. Eq. (11) indicates that the (partial) degree of for-
eign positionality plays a key role for tax coordination, as it directly af-
fects how much the government in country i is willing to pay for a
small decrease in the consumption in country k, ceteris paribus.11
Note also that an algebraic expression similar to Eq. (11) holds if the
pre-reform equilibrium is instead based on a Stackelberg game where
i is leader (as in subsection 3.2), with the only difference being that
1−αi should then be replaced by 1−αi−βi(∂c−k/∂c−i).
4.2. A globally efﬁcient allocation and the implicit marginal tax rates
Consider the (somewhat extreme) case where both countries can
negotiate with each other about tax policy without transaction costs.
Country i would then be willing to buy a further marginal tax increase
in country k as long as the welfare cost to i of paying k is lower than
the welfare gain to i of the associated reduced consumption in k. Let
us also assume that the countries succeed in ﬁnding an agreement
such that no Pareto improvements are possible. This means that the
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tive interpretation of such a resource allocation is that it corresponds to
the outcome of a global social planner aiming to obtain a globally
Pareto-efﬁcient allocation through maximization of utility for one of
the countries subject to a minimum utility restriction for the other
country and an overall resource constraint. A third interpretation,
suggested to us by one of the referees, is that an efﬁcient outcome
may be the result of a dynamic negotiation process in the framework
of inﬁnitely repeated games. Based on such a process, an efﬁcient tax
policy that internalizes all positional externalities might be self-
sustained due to the Folk theorem, in which case there is no need to
refer to a global social planner or an explicit negotiation process. In ei-
ther case, the optimalmarginal income tax rates needed in each country
to obtain such an efﬁcient allocation can be derived as follows:
Proposition 4. The globally Pareto-efﬁcient marginal income tax rate for
country i is given by
ti ¼ αi þ 1−α
i þ βi
1−αk þ βk
βk N 0:
Thus, the globally Pareto-efﬁcient marginal income tax rate looks al-
most like a conventional Pigouvian tax based on the sum of all people's
(including people from the other country) marginal willingness to pay
for reducing consumption by an individual in country i, which would
be given by
ti ¼−
ui
ci
uic
−
uk
ci
ukc
¼ αi þ βk:
Yet, the second term in the tax formula in Proposition 4, related to
the sum of the marginal willingness to pay by residents in the foreign
country, uk
ci
=ukc , has a modifying factor attached to it. We will return to
this factor and the intuition behind Proposition 4. Let us ﬁrst present
the more straightforward results from the symmetric case where the
positionality degrees are identical in both countries:
Corollary 1. If αi= αk= α and βi= βk= β, the globally Pareto-efﬁcient
marginal income tax rate for country i is given by
ti ¼ αi þ βk ¼ α þ β ¼ ρ N 0:
Hence, the Pareto-efﬁcient marginal income tax rate in the symmetric
case is a simple Pigouvian tax given by the aggregate global marginal
willingness to pay for reduced consumption by an individual in country
i. In turn, this sum equals the total degree of positionality, ρ. Basically,
the tax reﬂects the part of consumption that is waste, due to zero-sum
relative comparison effects, whereas leisure is purely non-positional
(by assumption). Corollary 1 provides a straightforward generalization
of the efﬁcient tax policy derived in the context of one-country
economies in, e.g., Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), and Dupor and Liu
(2003).
When interpreting Corollary 1, recall that αi, αk, βi andβk are not ex-
ogenous parameters but rather endogenous variables in the model.
Consequently, for the conditions on which Corollary 1 is based to hold
generally, i.e. for all levels of consumption and leisure, one would have
to impose very strong restrictions on the underlying utility functions.
This will be further discussed in Section 6. However, note that for
Corollary 1 to hold it is sufﬁcient that αi = αk and βi = βk in the Pareto
efﬁcient equilibrium, irrespective of whether these conditions are also
satisﬁed outside this equilibrium. Moreover, even if these conditions
do not strictly hold in the equilibrium either, the case when they do
holdmay still constitute a reasonable approximation andnatural bench-
mark case.Let us now turn to the modifying factor in the non-symmetric case,
i.e.,
1−αi þ βi
1−αk þ βk
:
Suppose ﬁrst that the β-factors are small, such that themodifying factor
can be approximated by (1− αi)/(1− αk). Then, if αi N αk, the modify-
ing factor for the marginal income tax rate in country i becomes less
than unity. The intuition is that αi N αk implies that the efﬁcientmargin-
al income tax in country i is larger than in country k. In turn, this means
that a larger fraction of an income increase in country i is taxed
away, such that a smaller fraction of this income increase causes a
negative consumption externality. In the more general case where the
β ‐ factors are not small, also these factors will affect how much of an
income increase that will be taxed away. A large β in country i then im-
plies that a larger fraction will be taxed away in country k, and vice
versa. Consequently, the relative weight given to domestic externality
correction is reduced in country i. This also explains why the β ‐ factors
affect themodifying factor in the opposite direction compared with the
α ‐ factors.
5. Differential consumption taxes and positional goods
In other parts of this paper we followmost of the earlier literature in
considering an economywithout differential consumption taxes. Yet, as
Frank (1985a, b) and others have noted, in reality some goods are most
likely more positional than other goods. For example, Alpizar et al.
(2005) found that cars and housing are much more positional than in-
surances. Let us here consider the case with m different consumption
goods in each country. We assume that the governments can use in-
come taxes as before, but also differential consumption taxes. That is,
the government in each country is free to use different percentage con-
sumption taxes for each good such that the consumer price of good h
(h = 1,…,m) is now equal to 1 + thi (instead of 1) for individuals in
country i. The utility of a representative individual in country i is then
given by
Ui ¼ vi ci1;…; cim; zi;Ri1;…;Rim; Si1;…; Sim
 
¼ vi ci1;…; cim; zi; ri1 ci1; ci1
 
;…; rim c
i
m; c
i
m
 
; si1 c
i
1; c
k
1
 
;…; sim c
i
m; c
k
m
  
¼ vi ci1;…; cim; zi; ci1−ci1;…; cim−cim; ci1−ck1;…; cim−ckm
 
¼ ui ci1;…; cim; zi; ci1;…; cim; ck1;…; ckm
 
:
ð12Þ
This enables us to deﬁne good-speciﬁc positionality measures. The par-
tial degrees of domestic and foreign positionality for good h in country i
are then given by
αih ¼
viRh
vich þ viRh þ viSh
;
βih ¼
viSh
vich þ viRh þ viSh
;
respectively, where vich ¼ ∂vi=∂cih , viRh ¼ ∂vi=∂R
i
h , and v
i
Sh
¼ ∂vi=∂Sih . αhi
can then be interpreted as the fraction of the utility increase from the
last dollar spent on good h that is due to the increased relative consump-
tion of good h compared with other people in the individual's own
country; βhi can be interpreted correspondingly with respect to people
in the other country.
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possible practical problems with implementing differential commodity
taxation, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 5. The optimal consumption tax on good h facing the repre-
sentative consumer in country i in Nash equilibrium is given by
tih ¼
αih−t
i
1−αih
:
Note that t i denotes themarginal income tax rate in country i as before.
We can immediately see that consumption taxes are redundant if and
only if the degrees of positionality are the same for all goods. In that
case, the positional externalities that each individual imposes on other
domestic residents are perfectly internalized by an income tax equal
to the degree of domestic positionality of each good, which would then
also equal the degree of domestic positionality of the aggregate con-
sumption. In all other cases we need differential consumption taxes.
The reasonwhy the optimal consumption taxes depend on themarginal
income tax, in addition to the good-speciﬁc positionality degrees, is that
the system is over-identiﬁed with bothmarginal income and consump-
tion taxes present. Any combination of taxes that fulﬁlls Proposition 5
implies an optimal allocation from the perspective of the government
in country i. For example, when ti = 0 it follows that thi = αhi/(1− αhi).
Consider next the case where the countries can negotiate without
transaction costs, or for any other reason obtain a globally Pareto-
efﬁcient allocation. Using the short notation
Γ i ¼ 1−α
k
h þ βkh
1−αih þ βih
; ð13Þ
we obtain the following result:
Proposition 6. The globally Pareto-efﬁcient consumption tax on good h
facing the representative consumer in country i is given by
tih ¼
αih þ Γ iβkh−ti
1−αih−Γ
iβkh
N
αih−t
i
1−αih
:
In the symmetric casewhere αhi = αhk = αh and βhi = βhk = βh, such that
Γ i = 1, this policy rule reduces to read
tih ¼
αh þ βh−ti
1−αh−βh
¼ ρh−t
i
1−ρh
N
αh−ti
1−αh
: ð14Þ
The modifying factor, Γ i, has a similar interpretation as its counterpart
derived in the context of optimal income taxation in Section 4. Compar-
ing Propositions 5 and 6, we can conclude that the argument for
international tax coordination based on cross-country positional
externalities is in principle equally strong for consumption taxes as for
income taxes.
6. Distributional concerns and asymmetric information
So far, we have assumed that people are identical within each coun-
try, and that the only reason for using income taxes is to correct for
positional externalities. In reality, however, taxation has many pur-
poses, a central one being to redistribute income. In this section, we
generalize the model to encompass heterogeneity and distribu-
tional concerns within each country. As a work horse, we utilize a
modiﬁed version of the Stern–Stiglitz optimal nonlinear income
tax model based on a self-selection approach with two ability
types in each country.
Each country is characterized by asymmetric information between
the government and the private sector, such that the government canobserve (and hence tax) income but not ability and leisure. Further-
more, we assume (as we did above) that the population in each country
is ﬁxed; this simpliﬁes the analysis and allows us to abstract from the
implications of labor mobility for redistributive policy at the national
level.
There are two ability types in each country and nji individuals of
ability type j in country i. Each such individual faces the following utility
function:
Uij ¼ vij cij; zij;Rij; Sij
 
¼ vij cij; zij; rij cij; ci
 
; sij c
i
j; c
k
  
¼ vij cij; zij; cij−ci; cij−ck
 
¼ uij cij; zij; ci; ck
  ; ð15Þ
for j = 1, 2. Eq. (15) allows for the same between-country differences in
preferences as Eq. (1); yet, it also allows the two ability types in the
same country to have different preferences and make different relative
consumption comparisons. All notations are the same as in the previous
sections, with the exception that the variables are both ability-type spe-
ciﬁc and country speciﬁc here (and not just country speciﬁc as above).
The individual budget constraint is given by
wijl
i
j−T
i wijl
i
j
 
¼ cij; ð16Þ
where lji = Ω− zji denotes the number of work hours by ability type j
in country i, and T i(⋅) is a nonlinear income tax decided by the govern-
ment in country i. The corresponding ﬁrst-order condition for the
consumption-leisure tradeoff becomes
uij;cw
i
j 1−T
i ′ wijl
i
j
  
−uij;z ¼ 0; ð17Þ
where uj,ci = ∂uji/∂cji and uj,zi = ∂uji/∂zji, while T i ′(wjilji) denotes the mar-
ginal income tax rate facing ability type j in country i.
The positionality degrees are deﬁned in the same general way as in
the representative-agent framework set out above. Hence, the partial
degrees of domestic and foreign positionality for an individual of ability
type j in country i are given by
αij ¼
vij;R
vij;c þ vij;R þ vij;S
and βij ¼
vij;S
vij;c þ vij;R þ vij;S
;
respectively. Since the utility functions may differ between types, the
positionality degrees may differ too for that particular reason (and, of
course, also because the two ability types face different constraints).
The interpretations are the same as before, with the only exception
that the degrees of positionality are ability-type speciﬁc here. The total
degree of positionality for an individual of ability type j in country i is
then deﬁned as ρji = αji + βji. For further use, we also calculate the
corresponding average degrees of positionality in country i as
αi ¼ n
i
1α
i
1 þ ni2αi2
ni1 þ ni2
; ð18aÞ
β
i ¼ n
i
1β
i
1 þ ni2βi2
ni1 þ ni2
; ð18bÞ
where n1i + n2i denotes the total population in country i.
6.1. The second-best problem of the government
Let type 1 be the low-ability type and type 2 the high-ability type,
which means that w2i N w1i . The objective of the government in each
county is again to obtain a Pareto-efﬁcient resource allocation, which
can be accomplished by maximizing the utility of the low-ability type
subject to a minimum utility restriction for the high-ability type, as
well as subject to a self-selection constraint and the budget constraint.
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wants to redistribute from the high-ability to the low-ability type, and
also assume that a self-selection constraint must be imposed to prevent
the high-ability type from mimicking the low-ability type.12 This self-
selection constraint can be written as
Ui2 ¼ ui2 ci2; zi2; ci; ck
 
≥ ui2 c
i
1;Ω−
wi1
wi2
li1; c
i; ck
 !
¼ U^i2: ð19Þ
The expression on the left-hand side of theweak inequality is the utility
of the high-ability type, whereas the right-hand side denotes the utility
of the mimicker; the hat symbol (^) denotes mimicker variables. A
mimicking high-ability individual faces the same before-tax income
(and in this case also consumption) as the low-ability type; yet, since
the mimicker is more productive than the low-ability type, he/she can
reach this income with less effort.
As we are considering a pure redistribution problem under position-
al externalities, it follows that the government's overall resource con-
straint can be written as
ni1 w
i
1l
i
1−c
i
1
 
þ ni2 wi2li2−ci2
 
¼ 0; ð20Þ
i.e., overall production equals overall consumption.
The public decision-problem will be written as a direct decision-
problem, as we also did in the representative-agent models analyzed
in Sections 2–5. Therefore, and by analogy with earlier literature
based on the self-selection approach to optimal income taxation
(e.g., Stiglitz, 1982; Boadway and Keen, 1993), the marginal income
tax rates can be derived implicitly by comparing the social and pri-
vate ﬁrst-order conditions for the number of work hours and private
consumption, respectively, for each ability type in each country.13
From the perspective of the national government, the social ﬁrst-
order conditions are derived based on the following Lagrangean for
an arbitrary country i:
Li ¼ Ui1 þ δi Ui2−U
i
2
 
þ λi Ui2−U^
i
2
 
þ γi ni1 wi1li1−ci1
 
þ ni2 wi2li2−ci2
  
: ð21Þ
In Eq. (21), δi, λi, and γi are Lagrange multipliers corresponding to
the constraints.
6.2. Optimal tax policy in the Nash-competition case
In the Nash equilibrium, the government in country i treats con-
sumption (and hence average consumption) in the other country as ex-
ogenous, and vice versa. Let
u^i2;c ¼
∂ui2 c
i
1;Ω−
wi1
wi2
li1; c
i; ck
 !
∂ci1
denote the mimicker's marginal utility of consumption based on the
utility formulation uji(⋅) in Eq. (15). We can then deﬁne the following12 In a more general framework, there will be a corresponding self-selection constraint
on the low-ability type to prevent each such individual from mimicking the high-ability
type. Yet, both self-selection constraints cannot bind at the same time, and the assumed
redistribution proﬁle suggests that the self-selection constraint (19) is the relevant one.
This also means that our study follows earlier literature based on the self-selection ap-
proach to optimal taxation, making it easy to compare our results with ﬁndings in other
studies. In a richer framework, e.g., where individuals differ not only in ability but also
in wealth such as in Cremer et al. (2001), the choice of binding self-selection constraint
would be less obvious.
13 See the Appendix for details.measure of difference in the partial degree of domestic positionality be-
tween the mimicker and the low-ability type:
αid ¼ λ
i
γi
u^i2;c
ni1 þ ni2
α^i2−α
i
1
 
: ð22Þ
To simplify the tax formulas, we use the short notationσji for the part
of the optimalmarginal income tax rate for type-j individuals in country
i that would be present also in a standard model where people are not
concerned with their relative consumption; see Eqs. (A42) and (A43)
in the Appendix. The marginal income tax policy in Nash equilibrium
can then be characterized as follows:
Proposition 7. In Nash equilibrium, the optimal marginal income tax rate
facing individuals of ability type j in country i is given by (for j = 1,2)
Ti ′ wijl
i
j
 
¼ σ ij þ αi 1−σ ij
 
− 1−αi
 
1−σ ij
  αid
1−αid
:
Inwhat follows, wewill not focus on the interpretation of σ1i andσ2i ,
except noting that σ2i =0, as these effects are well understood and ex-
plained elsewhere (e.g., Stiglitz, 1982). The second term reﬂects the in-
centive facing the domestic government to correct for positional
externalities and depends on the average degree of domestic
positionality. If σ1i N 0 (as in the standard optimal income tax model
where the consumers share a common utility function), this corrective
component is smaller for the low-ability type than for the high-ability
type. The third term reﬂects an incentive for the government to relax
the self-selection constraint by exploiting that the mimicker and the
low-ability type may differ in terms of positional concerns. Consider
ﬁrst the casewhere α^i2Nαi1, such thatα
idN0. Thismeans that an increase
in the average domestic consumption (with the average consumption in
the other country held constant) will cause a larger utility loss, in mon-
etary terms, for themimicker than for the low-ability type. Hence, an in-
crease in ci makes it less attractive to become a mimicker, implying that
the self-selection constraint is relaxed. This is clearly beneﬁcial from a
social point of view and implies a corresponding reason for reducing
the marginal income tax rate. The intuition for the opposite case
where αid b 0 is analogous. Note also that the result in Proposition 5 re-
sembles the tax policy implications of positional concerns derived for a
one-country economy by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008).
This is so because all positional externalities caused to the other country
are ignored by the Nash-competing national governments.
6.3. Optimal tax policy in the Stackelberg-competition case
Let us again assume, as we did in Subsection 3.2, that country i is a
Stackelberg leader in relation to country k, a Stackelberg follower. As
in Subsection 3.2 above, we focus on the policy incentives facing the
Stackelberg leader; the policy incentives facing the follower are analo-
gous to those facing the governments in the Nash game analyzed in
Subsection 6.2. Hence, the government in country i will treat the aver-
age consumption in country k as a function of the average consumption
in country i.
Before presenting the results, let us introduce the followingmeasure
of difference in the partial degree of foreign positionality between the
mimicker and the low-ability type:
βid ¼ λ
i
γi
u^i2;c
ni1 þ ni2
β^
i
2−β
i
1
 
; ð23Þ
and also introduce the following short notations:
ψ
i ¼ αi þ βi ∂c
k
∂ci
andψid ¼ αid þ βid ∂c
k
∂ci
:
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i
and ψid as measuring the “average degree of effective
positionality” and the “difference in the degree of effective positionality
between the mimicker and the low-ability type,” respectively, from
the point of view of the government in country i, which is acting as
a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis country k. In particular, note that
these measures also reﬂect the partial degrees of foreign
positionality (in addition to the partial degrees of domestic
positionality), since the government in country imay exploit the re-
lationship between ci and ck for purposes of externality correction
and redistribution.
Noting that β
i
N βid means that the welfare in country i decreases in
response to an increase in ck , ceteris paribus, the marginal income tax
policy can now be characterized as follows:
Proposition 8.
(i) The optimal marginal income tax rate for individuals of ability type j
in country i, where the government is a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis
country k, is given by (for j = 1,2)
Ti ′ wijl
i
j
 
¼ σ ij þ 1−σ ij
 
ψ
i
− 1−σ ij
 
1−ψ
i
  ψid
1−ψid
:
(ii) Given the levels of σ ji, αi, α id, β
i
, and βid, and if β
i
Nβid, the optimal
marginal income tax rates chosen by the Stackelberg leader are larg-
er (smaller) than the Nash equilibrium rates if the consumption in
country k is characterized by a cross-country keeping-up-with-
the-Joneses (staying-away-from-the-Joneses) propertywith respect
to the consumption in country i such that
∂ck
∂ci
N 0 b0ð Þ:
Themarginal income tax formula implemented by the Stackelberg lead-
er takes the same general form as that implemented by a follower. The
difference is that the Stackelberg leader behaves as if ψ is the appropri-
ate measure of positionality, whereas the follower behaves as in the
Nash game, where α is the appropriate measure of positionality. There-
fore, if the consumption of the Stackelberg follower is characterized by
the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses property discussed above, the policy
decided by the Stackelberg leader may be closer to a globally optimal
policy than that implemented by the follower. We will return to this
comparison below.
Note also that the interpretation of Proposition 8 is close – yet not
equivalent – to the interpretation of Proposition 7, due to that the
magnitudes (and possibly also the signs) of ψ
i
and ψid depend on the
reaction function ckðciÞ. If ∂ck=∂ciN0, which appears to be a plausible
assumption, the incentives to correct for positional externalities are
stronger for a government acting as a Stackelberg leader than for
a Nash competitor, whereas these incentives instead are weaker if ∂ck=
∂ci b 0(in fact, ifβ
i
is sufﬁciently large, we cannot rule out the possibility
that ψ
i
b 0, although this outcome appears very unlikely). Similarly, the
interpretation of the variable ψid is more complex than the interpreta-
tion of αid, as ψid reﬂects differences in the degree of positionality be-
tween the mimicker and the low-ability type in two dimensions. The
practical importance of Propositions 7 and 8 is, nevertheless, clear: the
two propositions show exactly what information the national policy
maker (who acts as a Nash competitor and Stackelberg leader, respec-
tively) needs in order to implement the desired resource allocation
through tax policy in a decentralized setting.
6.4. The scope for international cooperation
We showed in Subsection 4.1 that each government in the Nash
equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium, respectively, is willing to pay
a positive amount to the other country for it to increase its marginalincome taxes. Hence, there exists a Pareto-improving tax reform. The
situation in the more general second-best case is similar. That there
are two types of individuals in each country does not matter per se,
since it would be beneﬁcial for the other country if themarginal income
tax rates were increased for both types. Yet, what is crucial is that wel-
fare in one country is affected negatively by increased consumption in
the other country, i.e., the mimicker must not be so much more posi-
tional than the low-ability type that the welfare loss due to the direct
positional externality is fully offset by a welfare beneﬁt of increased
reference consumption through the self-selection constraint. To be
more speciﬁc, we have the following result:
Proposition 9. Based on either the Nash equilibrium or the Stackelberg
equilibrium, there is scope for Pareto-improving tax reforms through
small increases in the marginal income tax rates, provided that the direct
positional externality dominates the self-selection effect in the sense
that β
i
Nβid.
This is analogous to the results derived above. Consider next, as in
Subsection 4.2, the case where the countries can negotiate with each
other about the tax policy without transaction costs, or for any other
reason obtain a globally Pareto-efﬁcient allocation. Country i would
then be willing to buy a further tax increase in country k as long as the
welfare cost for country i of paying country k is smaller than thewelfare
gain of the reduced consumption in country k. Thismeans that country k
will take into account the welfare effects caused to country i, and vice
versa.
Without loss of any important insight, let us simplify by focusing on
a symmetric equilibrium where the two countries are identical in the
sense of the following assumption:
A1: αi ¼ αk ¼ α;βi ¼ βk ¼ β;αid ¼ αkd ¼ αd;βid ¼ βkd ¼ βd; and
ni1 þ ni2 ¼ nk1 þ nk2:
Note that these assumptions do not mean that the two countries are
identical also in other respects; they may still differ in terms of wage
and population distributions and preferences for leisure and private
consumption. By usingρ ¼ α þ β and ρd= αd+ βd, we can then derive
the following result:
Proposition 10. The globally Pareto-efﬁcient marginal income tax rate
under assumption A1 for individuals of ability type j in country i is given
by (for j = 1,2)
Ti ′ wijl
i
j
 
¼ σ ij þ ρ 1−σ ij
 
− 1−ρð Þ 1−σ ij
  ρd
1−ρd
:
Proposition 10 generalizes the Pareto-efﬁcient optimal tax structure de-
rived by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) for a one-country
economy to a two-country economy with international positional ex-
ternalities. It shows that an increase in the average degree of total
positionality (which is here given by the average degree of domestic
positionality in country i plus the average degree of foreign positionality
in country k) contributes to increase the marginal income tax rates im-
plemented for the residents of country i. Furthermore, if themimicker is
more (less) positional than the low-ability type, heremeasured in terms
of the total degree of positionality, there is an incentive to relax the self-
selection constraint through a lower (higher) marginal income tax rate
for each ability type.
Note once again that all degrees of positionality are endogenously
determined within the model. It is therefore sufﬁcient that assumption
A1 holds in the globally Pareto efﬁcient equilibrium for Proposition 10
to apply. It may nevertheless be illuminating to consider a more restric-
tive version of the model where assumption A1 holds generally, i.e., for
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(i) n11 = n12 = n1 and n21 = n22 = n2, and (ii) the utility functions take
the following form (for j= 1, 2):
Uij ¼ f ij 1−aj−bj
 
cij þ aj cij−ci
 
þ bj cij−ck
 
; zij
 
;
¼ f ij cij−ajci−bjck; zij
 
ð24aÞ
Ukj ¼ f kj 1−aj−bj
 
ckj þ aj ckj−ck
 
þ bj ckj−ci
 
; zkj
 
¼ f kj ckj−ajck−bjci; zkj
 
; ð24bÞ
where aj and bj are ﬁxed (yet type-speciﬁc) parameters. It follows
immediately that αi ¼ αk ¼ ðn1a1 þ n2a2Þ=ðn1 þ n2Þ and βi ¼ βk ¼
ðn1b1 þ n2b2Þ=ðn1 þ n2Þ are also ﬁxed parameters, and α id = α kd =
βid = βkd = 0.14 In other words, assumption A1 always applies, irre-
spective of differences in consumption levels and use of leisure between
ability-types and across countries. Note also that the utility functions
(Eqs. (24a) and (24b)) are allowed to differ both between ability-
types and countries, although the functional form assumption will, of
course, imply severe restriction compared to the general model.
In the symmetric casewhere assumption A1 holds in the Pareto efﬁ-
cient equilibrium,we can obtain a straightforward relationship between
the socially efﬁcient marginal income tax rates and the rates imple-
mented in the non-cooperative regimes (addressed in Propositions 7
and 8). Let TNi ′(wjilji), T Si ′(wjilji), and TCi ′(wjilji) denote the marginal
income tax rate implemented for ability type j when the government
in country i acts as a Nash competitor, Stackelberg leader, and in accor-
dance with the cooperative game set out here, respectively. The follow-
ing result is an immediate consequence of Propositions 7, 8, and 10:
Corollary 2. Under assumption A1, and given the levels of σ ji,α,β, αd, and
βd, we have
TiN ′ w
i
jl
i
j
 
b TiS ′ w
i
jl
i
j
 
b TiC ′ w
i
jl
i
j
 
f or j ¼ 1;2;
if (i) β N βd and (ii) ∂ck=∂c i ∈ ð0; 1Þ.
Clearly,β N βd means that themarginal income tax rate implement-
ed in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium falls short of the socially
efﬁcient rate, i.e., TNi ′(wjilji) b TCi ′(wjilji). The second condition then
means that the marginal income tax rate decided by the Stackelberg
leader falls between these two extremes. Note that this ranking applies
when the values of σ ji, α , β , αd, and βd are the same in these three
equilibria. While this is not likely to be the case in general, there are
no a priori reasons to believe that any of these variableswould be larger
in one particular equilibrium compared to another, suggesting that
Corollary 2 still constitutes an important benchmark case.
Overall, we conclude that the scope for international tax policy coor-
dination due to cross-country social comparisons remains large also in a
second-best world without the possibility of using non-distortionary
taxation. As an indication of the social value of tax coordination, let us
ﬁnally examine the difference in marginal income taxation between
the cooperative regime and the Nash-equilibrium under the assump-
tions in Corollary 2. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the
mimicker and the low-ability type are always equally positional, such
that αd = ρd = 0. By comparing Propositions 7 and 10, we obtain the
difference between the globally efﬁcient marginal tax rate and the
Nash rate as follows (for both ability types):
ΔTi ′ wijl
i
j
 
¼ ρ−αð Þ 1−σ ij
 
¼ β 1−σ ij
 
: ð25Þ14 Utility functions implying ﬁxed (i.e., parametric) degrees of positionality can also be
found in some earlier studies on optimal taxation under relative consumption compari-
sons in one-country models (e.g., Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; Dupor and Liu, 2003;
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2010).This measure can be interpreted as the part of the overall positional ex-
ternality in a second-best economy that is not internalized by the na-
tional governments in Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, as noted in the
introduction, there is little empirical evidence regardingβ. Let us never-
theless make some illustrative conjectures. According to questionnaire-
experimental research (e.g., Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002; Alpizar
et al., 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007), some 30–50% of an individual's utility
gain from increased consumption may be due to increased (within-
country) relative consumption. Similarly, happiness-based studies
often ﬁnd that a dominating share of consumption-induced well-being
in industrialized countries is due to relative effects (e.g., Easterlin,
2001; Luttmer, 2005). Thus, one might conjecture β to be in the order
of magnitude of 0.2, at least in some countries in a near future. If we
also assume that the optimal marginal income tax rate in the absence
of any relative consumption comparisons (i.e., σji) is equal to 50%, it fol-
lows thatΔT i ′(wjilji) = 0.1. This example means that the uninternalized
positional externalities correspond to some 10 percentage points of the
marginal income tax rates. Such orders of magnitude may reﬂect sub-
stantial welfare gains of tax coordination.7. Discussion
Cross-country social comparisonshavemost likely becomemore im-
portant over time. This is both intuitively plausible and consistent with
empirical evidence suggesting that increased globalization in recent
decades has inﬂuenced the social comparisons inherent in individual
well-being. In the present paper, we take this evidence seriously and
analyze optimal income taxation under relative consumption concerns
in a two-country framework, where each individual in each country
compares his/her own consumption both with that of other domestic
residents and with that of people in the other country. Furthermore,
our framework allows for differences in relative consumption concerns,
depending on whether they refer to within-country or between-
country comparisons, as well as for differences in preferences for rela-
tive consumption between individuals and across countries.
There are for sure many existing papers dealingwith strategic inter-
action and the potential for policy coordination between governments
due to environmental externalities as well as international labor and
capital mobility. Yet, in the present paper we explicitly disregard each
of these other reasons and show that international social comparisons
alone constitute an important reason for strategic interaction, and that
theremay be large social values of international tax policy coordination.
In doing this we distinguish between the tax policy implicit in non-
cooperative regimes where the national governments act as Nash
competitors to one another or engage in Stackelberg competition, and
the tax policy implicit in a cooperative regime where the countries
can negotiate over tax policy. Our choice to focus on international social
comparisons does not reﬂect a belief that othermotives for internation-
al tax coordination are unimportant. Rather, the results should be
interpreted as further strengthening the case for such coordination, as
recently suggested by Piketty (2014) and others.
We start by examining a simple framework where each country is
modeled as a representative-agent economy, which means that we dis-
regard distributional concerns within each country. If the national gov-
ernments behave as Nash competitors, the resulting tax policy only
internalizes the externalities that are due to within-country compari-
sons, meaning that the optimal marginal income tax rate in each coun-
try reﬂects the degree of domestic positionality. The tax policy chosen
by the leader country in a Stackelberg game reﬂects between-country
comparisons as well. Furthermore, if the residents of the Stackelberg
follower country are characterized by cross-country keeping-up-with-
the-Joneses preferences, then the marginal income tax implemented
by the leader country in the Stackelberg game typically exceeds that
implemented by the follower, as well as exceeds the marginal income
tax rates implicit in the Nash equilibrium. We also derive the globally
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cooperation typically leads to highermarginal income tax rates than im-
plicit in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, and under certain (fairly
reasonable) conditions also higher marginal income tax rates than im-
plemented by the leader country in the Stackelberg game. We also
show how the optimal marginal income tax rates in the cooperative
regime reﬂect domestic as well as foreign degrees of positionality.
Taken together, this implies clear arguments for international tax
coordination, which are shown to apply also to the case with several
consumption goods where differential consumption taxes are needed.
In the second part of the paper, we extend the analysis by allowing
the consumers in each country to differ in ability (productivity) and
assume that this ability is private information. This is wellmotivated be-
cause earlier research based on second-best analysis of one-country
models shows that the policy implications of positional concerns may
differ substantially from those that follow from representative-agent
models. Once again, we compare the three regimes mentioned above.
In general, these comparisons give ambiguous results, as externality
correction may either tighten or relax the self-selection constraint.
However, under a relatively mild additional assumption, namely that
the difference in the degree of foreign positionality between the
mimicker and the low-ability type is not too large, the qualitative results
for the representative-agent framework referred to above will continue
to hold also in the second-best setting.
We believe that the insights from the present paper, and in particu-
lar the scope for international tax coordination, will grow more impor-
tant over time. This is because we anticipate that the globalization
process will continue and that cross-country social comparisons will
correspondingly further increase in importance.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Combining Eqs. (9) and (10) gives
uiz ¼ wi uic þ uici
 
: ðA1Þ
Using uciw iti = uciwi − uzi from Eq. (3), substituting into Eq. (A1), and
solving for t i yields
ti ¼−
ui
ci
uic
: ðA2Þ
Finally, using Eqs. (1) and (4), we can rewrite Eq. (A2) in terms of the
degree of domestic positionality. Since uci = vci + vRi + vSi and uici ¼−
viR, we have
ti ¼ v
i
R
vic þ viR þ viS
¼ αi: ðA3Þ
QED
A.1. Comparative statics in subsection 3.2
The social ﬁrst-order condition for work hours in country k can be
written as
ukc þ ukck
 
wk−ukz ¼ 0: ðA4Þ
By total differentiation, while recognizing that ck ¼ ck, we have
ukcc þ ukckc
 
wk−ukzc
 
dck þ uk
ckc
þ uk
ckck
 
wk−uk
zck
 
dck
þ ukcz þ ukckz
 
wk−ukzz
 
dzk ¼− uk
cci
þ uk
ckci
 
wk−uk
zci
 
dci
: ðA5ÞNext, use the resource constraint in country k,
wk Ω−zk
 
−ck ¼ 0;
to derive
dzk
dck
¼− 1
wk
: ðA6Þ
Substituting Eq. (A6) into Eq. (A5) and solving for dck=dci gives
dck
dci
¼
uk
cci
þ uk
ckci
 
wk−uk
zci
Φ=wk
; ðA7Þ
where
Φ ≡− ukcc þ ukckc
 
wk
 2
− uk
ckc
þ uk
ckck
 
wk
 2
þ 2 ukcz þ ukckz
 
wk−ukzzN0
from the second-order conditions. Therefore, the right-hand side of
Eq. (A7) is positive if ðuk
cci
þ uk
ckci
Þwk−uk
zci
N0and vice versa. Now, differ-
entiate SMRSkcz ¼ ðukc þ ukck Þ=u
k
z with respect to c
i to get
∂SMRSkcz
∂ci
¼
uk
cci
þ uk
ckci
 
wk−uk
zci
ukc þ ukck
;
where we have used wk ¼ ukz=ðukc þ ukck Þ. We can then rewrite Eq. (A7)
such that
dck
dci
¼ u
k
z
Φ
∂SMRSkcz
∂ci
: ðA8Þ
Therefore, dck=dci N 0 ðb0Þ if ∂SMRSkcz=∂ci N 0 ðb0Þ. QED
Proof ofProposition2. Wecanwrite the Lagrangean of the Stackelberg
leader as
Li ¼ ui ci; zi; ci; ck ci
  
þ γi wi Ω−zi
 
−ci
 
: ðA9Þ
The ﬁrst-order conditions become
uic þ uici þ u
i
ck
∂ck
∂ci
¼ γi; ðA10Þ
uiz ¼ γiwi: ðA11Þ
Combine Eqs. (A10) and (A11) to derive
uiz ¼ wi uic þ uici þ u
i
ck
∂ck
∂ci
 !
: ðA12Þ
Next, combining Eqs. (3) and (A12) and solving for t i gives
ti ¼−
ui
ci
þ ui
ck
∂ck
∂ci
uic
: ðA13Þ
Finally, since uci = vci + vRi + vSi and uick ¼−v
i
S as deﬁned above, we ob-
tain
ti ¼
viR þ viS
∂ck
∂ci
vic þ viR þ viS
¼ αi þ ∂c
k
∂ci
βi: ðA14Þ
QED
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reduces its own consumption through a small increase in the marginal
income tax rate is given by
ui
ck
∂ck
∂tk
N 0;
while the domestic welfare effect in country k is equal to zero (since
each country has already made an optimal policy choice based on its
own objective and constraints). This holds irrespective of whether
the pre-reform equilibrium is based on the Nash or the Stackelberg
game, and whether in the latter case i is the leader or the follower.
QED
Proof of Proposition 4. The Lagrangean corresponding to the maxi-
mization of utility in country i subject to a constraint that utility is
held ﬁxed in country k and an overall resource constraint can be
written as
L ¼ Ui þ μ Uk−Uk
 
þ γ wi Ω−zi
 
−ci þwk Ω−zk
 
−ck
 
; ðA15Þ
where Ū k is the ﬁxedminimum utility for country k. The correspond-
ing ﬁrst-order conditions can be written as
uic þ uici þ μu
k
ci
¼ γ; ðA16Þ
ui
ck
þ μukc þ μukck ¼ γ; ðA17Þ
uiz=w
i ¼ γ; ðA18Þ
μukz=w
k ¼ γ: ðA19Þ
Eqs. (A18) and (A19) imply
μ ¼ u
i
z=w
i
ukz=wk
¼ u
i
z
ukz
wk
wi
: ðA20Þ
Combine Eqs. (A16) and (A17) and use Eq. (A20) to substitute for μ.
This gives
ukz
ukc
wi 1þ
ui
ci
uic
−
ui
ck
uic
 !
¼ u
i
z
uic
wk 1þ
uk
ck
ukc
−
uk
ci
ukc
 !
; ðA21Þ
while Eqs. (A16), (A18), and (A20) can be combined in a similar way
to give
ukz
ukc
¼
uiz
uic
uk
ci
ukc
wk
uiz
uic
−wi−
ui
ci
uic
wi
: ðA22Þ
Substituting Eq. (A22) into Eq. (A21) and using the individual ﬁrst-
order condition uzi /wi = uci [1− t i] imply
ti ¼−
ui
ci
uic
−
1þ
ui
ci
uic
−
ui
ck
uic
1þ
uk
ck
ukc
−
uk
ci
ukc
uk
ci
ukc
: ðA23Þ
Finally, rewriting Eq. (A23) in terms of positionality degrees such thatui
ci
=uic ¼−αi,uick=u
i
c ¼−βi,ukck=u
k
c ¼−αk, andukci=u
k
c ¼−βk gives the for-
mula in Proposition 4. QED
Proof of Corollary 1. Follows directly from Proposition 4.Proof of Proposition 5. The individual budget constraint can be writ-
ten as
wi Ω−zi
 
1−ti
 
þ τi ¼
Xm
l¼1c
i
l 1þ til
 
; ðA24Þ
and the Lagrangean corresponding the individual's decision problem is
given by
Ui þ μ i wi Ω−zi
 
1−ti
 
þ τi−
Xm
l¼1c
i
l 1þ til
  
:
The individual ﬁrst-order condition regarding the tradeoff between
consumption of good h and leisure then becomes
uich
uiz
¼ 1
wi
1þ tih
1−ti
: ðA25Þ
The governmental budget constraint is given by
wi Ω−zi
 
¼
Xm
l¼1c
i
l; ðA26Þ
implying the following Lagrangean associated with the Nash equilibri-
um:
Ui þ γi wi Ω−zi
 
−
Xm
l¼1c
i
l
 
: ðA27Þ
The government's ﬁrst-order condition for consumption of good h in
country i then becomes
uich þ uicih ¼ γ
i; ðA28Þ
whereas the optimum condition with respect to leisure is still given by
Eq. (10). Combining Eqs. (A28) and (10) gives
uiz ¼ wi uich þ uicih
 
: ðA29Þ
From Eq. (A25) we get uiz ¼ wiuich 1−t
i
1þtih
, which we can substitute into
Eq. (A29) and solve for thi to obtain
tih ¼
−ui
cih
=uich−t
i
1þ ui
cih
=uich
¼ α
i
h−t
i
1−αih
:
QED
Proof of Proposition 6. The Lagrangean corresponding to themaximi-
zation of utility in country i subject to a constraint that utility is held
ﬁxed in country k and an overall resource constraint can be written as
L ¼ Ui þ μ Uk−Uk
 
þ γ wi Ω−zi
 
þwk Ω−zk
 
−
Xm
l¼1 c
i
l þ ckl
  
: ðA30Þ
We can then combine the ﬁrst-order conditions in the same way as in
the derivations of Eqs. (A21) and (A22) and obtain
ukz
ukch
wi 1þ
ui
cih
uich
−
ui
ckh
uich
0
@
1
A ¼ uiz
uich
wk 1þ
uk
ckh
ukch
−
uk
cih
ukch
0
@
1
A; ðA31Þ
ukz
ukch
¼
uiz
uich
uk
cih
ukch
wk
uiz
uich
−wi−
ui
cih
uich
wi
: ðA32Þ
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i
z
wi ¼ 1−t
i
1þtih
uich imply
uk
cih
ukch
1þ
ui
cih
uich
−
ui
ckh
uich
0
@
1
A ¼ 1þ u
k
ckh
ukch
−
uk
cih
ukch
0
@
1
A 1−ti
1þ tih
−1−
ui
cih
uich
0
@
1
A: ðA33Þ
Finally, usingαih ¼−uicih=u
i
ch
andβih ¼−uickh=u
i
ch
in Eq. (A33) and solving
for thi implies Proposition 6. QED.
Proof of Proposition 7. The ﬁrst-order conditions for l1i , c1i , l2i , and c2i
associated with the Lagrangean in Eq. (21) are given as follows:
−ui1;z þ
wi1
wi2
λiu^i2;z þ γini1wi1 ¼ 0; ðA34Þ
ui1;c−λ
iu^i2;c−γ
ini1 þ
∂Li
∂ci
ni1
ni1 þ ni2
¼ 0; ðA35Þ
− δi þ λi
 
ui2;z þ γini2wi2 ¼ 0; ðA36Þ
δi þ λi
 
ui2;c−γ
ini2 þ
∂Li
∂ci
ni2
ni1 þ ni2
¼ 0; ðA37Þ
where
∂Li
∂ci
¼ ui
1;ci
þ δi þ λi
 
ui
2;ci
−λiu^i2;ci : ðA38Þ
Eq. (A38) thus measures the partial welfare effect for country i of an in-
crease in ci, ceteris paribus, which we will refer to as thewithin-country
positionality effect in what follows.
Consider ﬁrst the marginal income tax rate implemented for the
low-ability type. By combining Eqs. (A34) and (A35), we get
MRSi1;zc λ
iu^i2;c−
∂Li
∂ci
ni1
ni1 þ ni2
 !
¼ w
i
1
wi2
λiu^i2;z þ γini1 wi1−MRSi1;zc
 
: ðA39Þ
From Eq. (17) we havew1i −MRS1,zci = w1i T i ′(w1i l1i ). Substituting into
Eq. (A39) and solving for T i ′(w1i l1i ) gives
Ti ′ wi1l
i
1
 
¼ λ
iu^i2;c
γini1w
i
1
MRSi1;zc−
wi1
wi2
MR^Si2;zc
 !
−
MRSi1;zc
γiwi1 n
i
1 þ ni2
  ∂Li
∂ci
:
ðA40Þ
MRS1,zc
i = (∂u1i /∂z1i )/(∂u1i /∂c1i ) denotes themarginal rate of substitution
between leisure and private consumption for the low-ability type, and
MR^Si2;zc denotes the corresponding marginal rate of substitution for
themimicker. The result for thehigh-ability type is obtained equivalent-
ly by instead combining Eqs. (17), (A36), and (A37):
Ti ′ wi2l
i
2
 
¼− MRS
i
2;zc
γiwi2 n
i
1 þ ni2
  ∂Li
∂ci
: ðA41Þ
Let us now introduce σ ji as a short notation for the optimal marginal
income tax rate implemented for ability type j in country i in a standard
two-type model without any direct policy adjustment to relative con-
sumption concerns, i.e.,
σ i1 ¼
λiu^i2;c
γini1w
i
1
MRSi1;zc−
wi1
wi2
MR^Si2;zc
 !
; ðA42Þ
σ i2 ¼ 0: ðA43ÞUsing Eqs. (A42) and (A43) in Eqs. (A40) and (A41) we can, write
the optimal marginal income tax rate for individuals of ability type j in
country i in the following general form:
Ti ′ wijl
i
j
 
¼ σ ij−
MRSij;zc
γiwij n
i
1 þ ni2
  ∂Li
∂ci
: ðA44Þ
Let us next explore the within-country positionality effect. We start
by re-expressing the terms of Eq. (A38). From the utility function (15)
follows that
ui
j;ci
¼−αijuij;c: ðA45Þ
Substituting Eq. (A45) into Eq. (A38) gives
∂Li
∂ci
¼−αi1ui1;c− δi þ λi
 
αi2u
i
2;c þ λiα^i2u^i2;c: ðA46Þ
Now, Eqs. (A35) and (A37) can be rewritten as
ui1;c ¼ λiu^i2;c þ γini1−
∂Li
∂ci
ni1
ni1 þ ni2
;
δi þ λi
 
ui2;c ¼ γini2−
∂Li
∂ci
ni2
ni1 þ ni2
;
which if substituted into Eq. (A46) imply, after collecting terms and
using Eq. (18a),
∂Li
∂ci
¼−γi ni1 þ ni2
  αi
1−αi
þ λiu^i2;c
α^i2−αi1
1−αi
: ðA47Þ
Using Eq. (22) in Eq. (A47) implies thatwe canwrite thewithin-country
positionality effect as
∂Li
∂ci
¼−γi ni1 þ ni2
 αi−αid
1−αi
: ðA48Þ
Substituting Eq. (A48) into Eq. (A44), we obtain
Ti ′ wijl
i
j
 
¼ σ ij þ
MRSij;zc
wij
αi
1−αi
−
λiu^i2;c
γi ni1 þ ni2
  α^i2−αi1
1−αi
 !
¼ σ ij þ
MRSij;zc
wij
αi−αid
1−αi
: ðA49Þ
Finally, usingMRSj,zci /wji = 1− T i ′ (wjilji) in Eq. (A49) and then solving
for T i ′ (wjilji) gives
Ti ′ wijl
i
j
 
¼ 1−α
i
1−αid
σ ij þ
αi−αid
1−αid
; ðA50Þ
which can be re-arranged to give the tax formula in Proposition 7. QED
Proof of Proposition 8. Let us rewrite the Lagrangean in Eq. (21) to
make the Stackelberg properties explicit:
Li ¼ ui1 ci1; zi1; ci; ck ci
  
þ δi ui2 ci2; zi2; ci; ck ci
  
−~U
i
2
 
þλi ui2 ci2; zi2; ci; ck ci
  
−u^i2 c
i
1;Ω−
wi1
wi2
li1; c
i; ck ci
  ! !
þγi ni1 wi1li1−ci1
 
þ ni2 wi2li2−ci2
   : ðA51Þ
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to the number of work hours for
both ability types remain the same as in the Nash equilibrium case,
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are given as
ui1;c−λ
iu^i2;c−γ
ini1 þ
∂Li
∂ci
ni1
ni1 þ ni2
¼ 0; ðA52Þ
δi þ λi
 
ui2;c−γ
ini2 þ
∂Li
∂ci
ni2
ni1 þ ni2
¼ 0; ðA53Þ
in which
∂Li
∂ci
¼ ui
1;ci
þ ui
1;ck
∂ck
∂ci
þ δi þ λi
 
 ui
2;ci
þ ui
2;ck
∂ck
∂ci
 !
−λi u^i2;ci þ u^
i
2;ck
∂ck
∂ci
 !
: ðA54Þ
By analogy to Eq. (A38), we can interpret Eq. (A54) as measuring
the within-country positionality effect for the Stackelberg leader. The
difference is that country i is here assumed to be ﬁrst mover and will,
therefore, also consider the indirect relationship between ci and ck ,
which provides an additional channel through which the government
may increase the domestic welfare. Since the social ﬁrst-order condi-
tions are analogous to those in the Nash equilibrium case, with the
only exception that the expression for ∂Li=∂ci takes a different form in
(A52) and (A53) compared with (A35) and (A37), it follows that the
optimal marginal income tax rates can be written as
Ti ′ wijl
i
j
 
¼ σ ij−
MRSij;zc
γiwij n
i
1 þ ni2
  ∂Li
∂ci
: ðA55Þ
Eq. (A55) takes the same general form as Eq. (A44). To be able to
rewrite Eq. (A55) in terms of degrees of positionality, we will further
explore the within-country positionality effect in the Stackelberg case.
By using Eq. (15) and the deﬁnition of the partial degree of foreign
positionality, we obtain
ui
j;ck
¼−vij;S ¼−βijuij;c: ðA56Þ
Substituting Eq. (A56) into Eq. (A54) gives
∂Li
∂ci
¼−ui1;c αi1 þ βi1
∂ck
∂ci
 !
−ui2;c δ
i þ λi
 
αi2 þ βi2
∂ck
∂ci
 !
þλiu^i2;c α^i2 þ β^
i
2
∂ck
∂ci
 ! : ðA57Þ
Rewriting Eqs. (A52) and (A53) such that
ui1;c ¼ λiu^i2;c þ γini1−
∂Li
∂ci
ni1
ni1 þ ni2
;
δi þ λi
 
ui2;c ¼ γini2−
∂Li
∂ci
ni2
ni1 þ ni2
;
and then substituting into Eq. (A57) gives (after collecting terms)
∂Li
∂ci
¼−γi ni1 þ ni2
  αi þ βi ∂ck
∂ci
1−αi−β
i ∂ck
∂ci
þ λiu^i2;c
α^i2 þ β^
i
2
∂ck
∂ci
−αi1−β
i
1
∂ck
∂ci
1−αi−β
i ∂ck
∂ci
: ðA58ÞUsing the deﬁnitions of αid and βid, Eq. (A58) can be written as
∂Li
∂ci
¼−γi ni1 þ ni2
 αi þ βi ∂c
k
∂ci
− αid þ βid ∂c
k
∂ci
 !
1−αi−β
i ∂ck
∂ci
¼−γi ni1 þ ni2
 ψi−ψid
1−ψ
i
; ðA59Þ
where ψ
i ¼ αi þ βi ∂ck
∂ci
and ψid ¼ αid þ βid ∂ck
∂ci
. The equation in
Proposition 8 then follows by analogy to theproof of Proposition 7 by re-
placing αi and αid with ψ
i
and ψid, respectively, in Eq. (A48).
To prove (ii), multiply and divide the second term on the right-hand
side of the tax formula in the proposition by 1− ψid and rearrange to
derive
Ti ′ wijl
i
j
 
¼ σ ij þ
1−σ ij
 
ψ
i
−ψid
 
1−ψid
¼ σ ij þ
1−σ ij
 
αi−αid
 
þ βi−βid
  ∂ck
∂ci
 !
1− αid þ βid ∂c
k
∂ci
 ! : ðA60Þ
With β
i
Nβid, and if ∂ck=∂ciN0 (b 0), the right-hand side of Eq. (A60)
is larger (smaller) than in the Nash casewhere all β− terms are absent.
QED
Proof of Proposition 10. Consider the Lagrangean corresponding to
the maximization of the utility facing the low-ability type in country i,
while holding constant the utility of the high-ability type in country i
and the utility facing both ability types in country k subject to a self-
selection constraint in each country and an overall resource constraint:
Li ¼ Ui1 þ δ Ui2−U
i
2
 
þ λ Ui2−U^
i
2
 
þω Uk2−U^
k
2
 
þ μ Uk1−U
k
1
 
þ υ Uk2−U
k
2
 
þγ ni1 wi1li1−ci1
 
þ ni2 wi2li2−ci2
 
þ nk1 wk1lk1−ck1
 
þ nk2 wk2lk2−ck2
   ;
ðA61Þ
where Ūjk for j = 1,2 denote the minimum utility levels for residents in
country k. The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to leisure and con-
sumption for the individuals in country i take the same general form
as Eqs. (A34)–(A37), implying that Eq. (A44) holds here as well. Yet,
the relevant positionality effect attached to ci is now different and
given by
∂Li
∂ci
¼ ui
1;ci
þ δþ λð Þui
2;ci
−λu^i2;ci þ ω þ υð Þuk2;ci−ωu^
k
2;ci þ μuk1;ci ; ðA62Þ
since country i will, in this case, recognize the welfare effects it causes
on country k. The corresponding social ﬁrst-order conditions with re-
spect to leisure and consumption for country k are given by
−μuk1;z þωu^k2;z
wk1
wk2
þ γnk1wk1 ¼ 0; ðA63Þ
μuk1;c−ωu^
k
2;c−γn
i
1 þ
∂Li
∂ck
nk1
nk1 þ nk2
¼ 0; ðA64Þ
− υþωð Þuk2;z þ γnk2wk2 ¼ 0; ðA65Þ
υþωð Þuk2;c−γnk2 þ
∂Li
∂ck
nk2
nk1 þ nk2
¼ 0; ðA66Þ
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∂Li
∂ck
¼ ui
1;ck
þ δi þ λi
 
ui
2;ck
−λu^i2;ck þ ω þ υð Þuk2;ck−ωu^
k
2;ck þ μuk1;ck :
ðA67Þ
Since the positionality effect for each country is nowdifferent compared
with those associated with the non-cooperative regimes analyzed
above, the optimal marginal income tax rates as expressed in terms of
relative consumption comparisons will of course also be different.
Substituting Eqs. (A34)–(A37) and (A63)–(A67) into Eq. (A62), and
rearranging, gives
∂Li
∂ci
¼−αi1 λu^i2;c þ γni1−
∂Li
∂ci
ni1
ni1 þ ni2
 
 !
−αi2 γn
i
2−
∂Li
∂ci
ni2
ni1 þ ni2
 
 !
−βk1 ωu^
k
2;c þ γnk1−
∂Li
∂ck
nk1
nk1 þ nk2
 
 !
−βk2 γn
k
2−
∂Li
∂ck
nk2
nk1 þ nk2
 
 !
þλα^i2u^i2;c þωβ^
k
2u^
k
2;c
:
ðA68Þ
Using next the measures of average degrees of positionality deﬁned
in Eqs. (18a) and (18b) and rearranging gives
∂Li
∂ci
1−αi
 
¼−γ ni1 þ ni2
 
αi þ λu^i2;c α^i2−αi1
 
−γ nk1 þ nk2
 
β
k
þωu^k2;c β^
k
2−β
k
1
 
þ βk ∂L
i
∂ck
:
ðA69Þ
We can derive an analogous equation for ck:
∂Li
∂ck
1−αk
 
¼−γ ni1 þ ni2
 
β
i þ λu^i2;c β^
i
2−β
i
1
 
−γ nk1 þ nk2
 
αk
þωu^k2;c α^k2−αk1
 
þ βi ∂L
i
∂ci
:
ðA70Þ
Using the deﬁnitions of α id and βid and the corresponding measures
αkd and βkd, substituting Eq. (A70) into Eq. (A69), and then using α i ¼
αk ¼ α, βi ¼ βk ¼ β, α id = α kd = α d, βid = βkd = βd, and n1i + n2i =
n1
k + n2k = n1 + n2, we obtain the positionality effect for the average
consumption in country i as follows:
∂Li
∂ci
¼−γ n1 þ n2ð Þρ−ρ
d
1−ρ
; ðA71Þ
where ρ ¼ α þ β and ρd= αd+ βd. This positionality effect reﬂects the
welfare effects of an increase in ci facing both countries. This is also the
reasonwhy the positionality effect is governed by the average degree of
total positionality, ρ , and the difference in the degree of total
positionality between themimicker and the low-ability type, ρd, instead
of the corresponding measures (α and α d) as in the non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium. Using Eq. (A71) in Eq. (A44), Proposition 10 follows
by analogy to the proofs of Propositions 7 and 8. QED
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